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Juror selection is arguably one of the most critical steps of any jury trial.
Lawyers use experts, technology, and intuition to obtain favorable juries by
eliminating those who are unsympathetic through strikes for cause and per-
emptory strikes. While peremptory strikes do not require judicial approval, if
the strike is based on a juror's race or gender, then there has been a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Fourteenth
Amendment ensures that all persons get equal access to civil rights, which
includesthe opportunity to sit on a jury. The introduction of technology into
voir dire methodology has made the review of strikes as potential violations
of the Equal Protection Clause more challenging. While voir dire is meant to
ensure the presence of an impartial jury by eliminating those with potential
biases, lawyers use voir dire as an opportunity to select jurors favorable to
their clients. Peremptory challenges are important tools in lawyers' arsenals:
they are used to strike jurors who may have preconceived notions about the
outcome of the case. 2 Unlike challenges for cause, peremptory challenges do
not require judicial approval.3 Lawyers and jury consultants use a variety of
methods, including technologies like jury selection software, to determine
which jurors to eliminate. Software programs which consider race, gender, or
ethnicity in recommending which jurors to strike may violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
II. JURY SELECTION SOFTWARE AND ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY
Jury selection software relies on demographic characteristics such as
race, gender, and age to determine whether a prospective juror is likely to be
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1. Robert A. Caplen, When Batson Met Grutter: Exploring the Ramifications of
the Supreme Court's Diversity Pronouncements Within the Computerized Jury
Selection Paradigm, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 65, 76 (2007) (noting the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury requires impartiality).
2. William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, Bias and the Economics of Jury Selec-
tion, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 223, 227 (2000).
3. Id.
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more sympathetic toward a particular side.4 While there is conflicting re-
search about the reliability of using demographics to predict juror behavior,5
there are also questions about whether these technologies violate the Equal
Protection Clause.6
In the landmark case Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that
striking jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause.7 The
Court later held that the Equal Protection Clause also prohibits strikes based
on gender8 and ethnicity.9 Lower courts have expanded Batson to include
religion,O and most recently, sexual orientation."] Many jurisdictions hold
that any consideration of race or gender in the decision to strike a juror will
invalidate that challenge, while others uphold strikes as long as a neutral
explanation can also be given. Accordingly, software technologies that in-
clude race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation in their calculations-and
recommend peremptory strikes based on those qualifications-may violate
the Fourteenth Amendment.12
Batson challenges are reviewed for clear error at the appellate level. The
appellate court usually defers to the trial court's determination of a strike's
legitimacy. This is because the trial court, as the fact finder, is presumed to
bein the best position to evaluate whether the reason offered for a strike is
legitimate, or merely a pretext for discrimination. However, the videotaping
of voir dire could justify a de novo standard of review for two reasons: (1)
the appellate court would see how a trial developed in its entirety, including
the parties' opening and closing statements; and (2) using that omniscient
view, the court could then evaluate the entire circumstances of a juror strike
and Batson challenge.
4. James R. Gadwood, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down: JuryQuest in A
Batson World, 88 B.U. L. REV. 291, 292 (2008) (noting that JuryQuest
software uses race, gender, age, education, occupation, marital status, and prior
jury service as factors for striking potential jurors).
5. See generally M. Juliet Bonazzoli, Jury Selection and Bias: Debunking Invidi-
ous Stereotypes through Science, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 247, 250 (1998).
6. Caplen, supra note 1, at 83.
7. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
9. See generally Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
10. See generally United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 668 (2d Cir. 2003);
United States v. Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); State v.
Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
11. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014).
12. Caplen, supra note 1, at 74 (quoting Debra Sahler, Comment, Scientifically
Selecting Jurors While Maintaining Professional Responsibility: A Proposed
Model Rule, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 383, 384 n.2 (1996)) (internal citations
omitted).
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Modern jury selection has been characterized as "part art, part science,"
and as a "highly scientific art form." Both characterizations suggest an in-
creased use of technology.13 Social scientists served the purpose of recently
developed jury selection software. The increased reliance on social scientists
in the jury selection process in the 1970's facilitated the emergence of an
industry of expensive, professional jury consultants. 14 "Now, as proverbial
juries deliberate over the efficacy of pricy jury consultants, lawyers have
begun to utilize new jury selection technologies incorporating computer
software solutions that purport to assist with impaneling a responsible
jury."5 Technological advances have greatly reduced the cost of jury selec-
tion software.16 Some have even referred to jury selection software as "com-
puter-based alternatives to jury consultants."]7 However, it is unclear as to
whether peremptory strikes based on recommendation by programs that con-
sider race and gender as part of the formula would survive constitutional
scrutiny. 18
A number of jury selection software programs rely on demographic in-
formation to predict whether a prospective juror is sympathetic or biased to a
case.' 9 For instance, JuryQuest factors race, gender, age, education, occupa-
tion, marital status, and prior jury service.20 Other programs consider number
of children, income, and religion, in addition to, or in place of factors previ-
ously mentioned.21 Nonetheless, the efficacy of using demographic informa-
tion to predict jury bias is in dispute. Software designers claim that their
statistical models are accurate predictors, and are constantly updated as the
13. Id. at 71-72.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 72.
16. Id. at 73.
17. Id.
18. Caplen, supra note 1, at 74.
19. A preliminary search on Google revealed Jury Box, http://www.jurybox.com
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014); Jury Guru, http://juryguru.com (last visited Mar. 3,
2014); Grand Voir Dire, http://www.grandvoirdire.com (last visited Mar. 3,
2014); Net Data, http://www.netdatacorp.net/jury (last visited Mar. 3, 2014);
and CountySuite, http://www.teleosoft.com/jury.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2014). The search revealed others that are not individualized, analyzed, nor
discussed in this article. However, a basic internet query for SMARTjury, ref-
erenced in Breyer's concurring opinion in Miller-El v. Dretke, infra, did not
lead to a developer or marketing cite, suggesting that particular program did
not survive the test of time. See also Caplen, supra note I, at 77 (mentioning
JuryQuest).
20. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 292.
21. Caplen, supra note 1, at 79.
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technology is used.22 Some studies suggest that jury selection software can
increase a lawyer's ability to correctly classify jurors by nineteen percent:
from fifty percent to sixty nine percent.23
Stereotypescan be a valuable tools-especially considering that judges
have discretion in limiting the time an attorney may spend conducting voir
dire. But relying too heavily on stereotypes can prevent lawyers "from listen-
ing to the answer[s] [to questions in voir dire] with an open mind," and can
result in elimination of jurors who may favor the desired outcome. 24 Whether
demographic information can correctly predict jury bias is debatable.25 How-
ever, many lawyers "behave as if these biases are real and predictable," so it
is nonetheless important to discuss the constitutionality of using this type of
technology in jury selection.26
Il. THE HISTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND JURY SELECTION
A. Strauder v. West Virginia (1879)
In Strauder v. West Virginia, a seminal case in jury selection jurispru-
dence,27 the Supreme Court struck down a statute prohibiting African-Ameri-
cans from serving on a jury on the grounds that such an exclusion violated
potential jurors' Equal Protection rights.28 The Court noted that the Four-
teenth Amendment "was designed to assure . . . the enjoyment of all the civil
rights ... and to give that race the protection of the general government, in
that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States."29 The Four-
teenth Amendment not only bestowed citizenship and privileges, such as the
right to siton a jury, but it also denied states the power to withhold such
rights. Equally important, the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congressthe
power to enforce those rights.30 Accordingly, "[e]xclusion of black citizens
22. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 293.
23. Caplen, supra note 1, at 80 (considering an argument by Solomon M. Fulero &
Steven D. Penrod, Attorney Jury Selection Folklore: What Do They Think and
How Can Psychologists Help?, 3 FORENSIC REP. 233, 241 (1990)).
24. LISA BLUE & ROBERT HIRSCHHORN, BLUE'S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION § 1.7
(West & ATLA 2004).
25. Neilson & Winter, supra note 2, at 224.
26. Id.
27. See generally Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see also Caplen,
supra note 1, at 83.
28. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S.
303).
29. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306.
30. Id.
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from service as jurors constitutes a primary example of the evil the Four-
teenth Amendment was designed to cure." 31
The Strauder Court looked specifically at statutes and state laws that
were facially discriminatory. The statutes' express denial of African-Ameri-
cans' right to participate in the administration of laws as jurors, violated their
right to equal justice.32 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by
a jury of one's peers. It cannot be said that an African-American man re-
ceives equal protection of the laws when a white man is entitled to a jury
composed of members of his race, but an African-American man is not. 33
Strauder deemed jury selection laws that are facially discriminatory on
the basis of race to be unconstitutional.34 However, that decision did not ad-
dress the use of peremptory challenges. These challenges require no explana-
tion by the challenger. In addition, it is also unnecessary to challenge a law
that is facially neutral, but discriminatory in application.35 Furthermore, be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment was created to secure civil rights for a
''race recently emancipated," the application of Equal Protection was strictly
applied to African-American men, and did not create protections on the basis
of gender or other racial groups. 36
B. Systematic Exclusion on the Basis of Race
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court held that facially neutral laws
that are discriminatorily applied violate the Fourteenth Amendment.37 Under
this analysis, practices resulting in the systematic exclusion of African-
Americans are deemed denials of Equal Protection. For example, a Texas
procedure for hand-picking grand jurors was found unconstitutional where
the population was twenty percent African-American, only a fraction of that
percentage was called for jury duty, and those called were placed at the back
of the jury, ensuring they would never serve. 38 The Court outlawed a similar
procedure in Georgia where judges handpicked jurors from voter registration
cards that were colored-coded, white for white voters, and yellow for Afri-
can-American voters. This process resulted in the total exclusion of African-
31. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. 303).
32. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
33. Id. at 309.
34. Id. at 307.
35. See Heather Davenport, Blinking Reality: Race and Criminal Jury Selection in
Light of Ovalle, Miller-El, and Johnson, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 949, 955-56
(2006) (citing state laws for jury qualifications that are facially neutral but have
a discriminatory impact on minorities, like reading requirements for jurors, or
culling of jurors from driver's license registrations).
36. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306.
37. Davenport, supra note 35, at 959.
38. Id. at 959-60 (referring to Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940)).
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American jurors on the jury. 39 These laws were facially neutral, but allowed
too much discretion on the part of the grand jury commissioners, resulting in
discriminatory elimination of jurors. These laws were therefore deemed vio-
lations of the Fourteenth Amendment, and stricken as unconstitutional.40
In 1968, Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act, which
required juries to be comprised of a fair cross-section of the communities in
which the courts resided.41 It also mandated that all citizens should have the
opportunity to be considered for grand and petit juries in the district courts.42
However, the law primarily addressed the process of calling jurors to sit on a
panel, and focused on establishing uniform ways to call jurors for duty.43 The
Act did not address the use of peremptory strikes.
In Alexander v. Louisiana,44 the Court addressed the systematic exclu-
sion of African-Americans from jury panels. The Alexander Court held that
no mathematical standards exist for calculating what constitutes systematic
exclusion, determining that courts need to do a factual inquiry in each case.45
In that case, the Louisiana court sent questionnaires to potential jurors asking
about race in one of the questions.46 Of the 7,374 questionnaires returned,
1,015 (13.76 percent) had been completed by African-Americans.47 The com-
missioners then attached an information card to each returned questionnaire
indicating, among other things, the person's race.48The commissioners re-
moved about 5,000 questionnaires, ostensibly because those respondents
were not qualified for grand jury service, or were exempted under state law.49
Commissioners placed the remaining 2,000 on a table, selected four hundred
of them-supposedly at random-and placed them in juror panels of
twenty. 50 Only twenty seven (6.75 percent) were African-American.51
39. Id. at 960 (referring to Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 563 (1953)).
40. Id. at 960-61.
41. Id. at 961.
42. Id.
43. J. David Hittner & Eric J.R. Nichols, Jury Selection in Federal Civil Litigation:
General Procedures, New Rules, and the Arrival of Batson, 23 TEx. TECH L.
REv. 407, 411 (1992).
44. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
45. Id. at 628.




50. Alexander, 405 U.S. at 627.
51. Id.
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In Alexander, only one member of the juror pool was African-Ameri-
can; but he did not serve on the jury.52 Although a defendant does not have
the right to have members of his race on the jury,53 he does have the right to
ensure that the state does not "deliberately and systematically deny to mem-
bers of his race the right to participate as jurors in the administration of
justice."54
IV. APPLYING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE TO
PEREMPTORY STRIKES
A. Swain v. Alabama (1965)
The Supreme Court first addressed the discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes in Swain v. Alabama, where the Court held that eliminating members
of a specific race in this manner did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.55
In Swain, the Court refused to extend Strauder to peremptory challenges,
reasoning that subjecting "the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to
the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would
entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the [peremptory] chal-
lenge."56 The Court also relied on the premise that purposeful discrimination
must not be assumed or merely asserted,57 but proven58 with a quantum of
evidence.59
Relying on precedential decisions, the defendant Swain presented the
Court with two arguments: (1) that Alabama's jury selection laws were dis-
criminatory; and (2) that the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes violated
Equal Protection.60 The Court rejected the defendant's first argument noting
"[w]e cannot say that purposeful discrimination based on race alone is satis-
factorily proved by showing that an identifiable group in a community is
underrepresented by as much as ten percent."61
52. Id.
53. Id. at 628 (relying on Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880)).
54. Id. at 628-29.
55. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965) (relying on Brownfield v.
South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426 (1903); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903);
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592
(1869)).
56. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22.
57. Id. at 205.
58. Id. (relying on Tarrance, 188 U.S. at 519; Martin v. Texas. 200 U.S. 316
(1906)).
59. Id. (relying on Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940)).
60. Swain, 380 U.S. at 202.
61. Id. at 208-09.
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The Court also rejected the defendant's second argument on grounds
that peremptory challenges do not require an explanation and afford a
method of securing fair and impartial juries.62 "This system, it is said, in and
of itself, provides justification for striking any group of otherwise qualified
jurors in any given case, whether they be [African-Americans], Catholics,
accountants or those with blue eyes."63 The Court relied on the tradition of
peremptory strikes to justify the lack of judicial scrutiny.64 Although not
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,65 the Court regarded the use of peremp-
tory strikes as one of the "most important rights of the accused."66 In addi-
tion, the presence of challenges for cause provides an avenue to remove
jurors with bias.67 The majority view was that the nature of a peremptory
strike is one that is without reason, without inquiry, and not subject to the
court's control.68
The Swain Court stated that there is a rebuttable presumption that prose-
cutors exercise peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner.69 This cre-
ates a high burden on the defendant to negate that presumption.70 "Thus,
petitioners must, in order to state a prima facie equal protection violation,
'show [a] pattern of discrimination' by alleging prosecutorial misconduct in
prior cases wherein 'the prosecutor used his strikes to remove [African-
Americans].' "71 This requirement to prove systematic discriminatory prac-
tices over a period of time put a "crippling burden of proof' on the defen-
dant, and essentially made prosecutorial challenges "largely immune from
scrutiny."72
B. Batson v. Kentucky (1986)
In 1986, twenty-one years after its holding in Swain, the Supreme Court
reexamined the use of peremptory challenges and Equal Protection and found
the Swain standard inconsistent with the principles of equal justice. In Batson
v. Kentucky, the Court expressly overruled Swain and extended Equal Protec-
62. Id. at 212.
63. See generally id. at 214-18.
64. Id. at 212.
65. Id. at 219 (relying on Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
66. Swain, 380 U.S. (relying on Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408
(1894)).
67. Id. at 219-20.
68. Id. at 220.
69. Id. at 222.
70. Caplen, supra note 1, at 96.
71. Id. (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 226).
72. Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986)).
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tion to apply to the exclusion of jurors by peremptory strikes.73 The Court
reasoned "[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire commu-
nity. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from ju-
ries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."74
Subsequent decisions applied the Batson protections to gender75 and
ethnicity.76
Batson gave rise to a three-step burden shifting framework for challeng-
ing discriminatory peremptory strikes.77 First, the challenging party must
make a prima facie showing that all of the facts and circumstances give rise
to an inference of discrimination.78 Second, the burden shifts to the striking
party to provide a neutral explanation for the strike.79 Third, the court then
determines whether there has been purposeful discrimination; if so, the Equal
Protection Clause has been violated.80
i. Batson's Step One: Prima Facie Showing of Discrimination
The Batson Court held that a defendant could establish prima facie pur-
poseful discrimination solely on the basis of peremptory strikes.8i Originally,
the defendant had to prove that she was a member of a cognizable racial
group and the opposing party was trying to exclude members of that same
racial group. 82 However, later holdings stated that it was the juror's individ-
ual right not to be excluded on the basis of race; therefore, the excluded juror
and the defendant do not have to be of the same race. 83 This protection in
jury selection applies to civil and criminal cases alike.84
There are several ways that a defendant can show purposeful discrimi-
nation in a peremptory challenge. The Batson Court rejected the notion that
repeated exclusions of members of a social group were necessary to show
73. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
74. Id. at 87.
75. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
76. See generally Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991).
77. Caplen, supra note 1, at 100; see also Gadwood, supra note 4, at 297.
78. Caplen, supra note lat 100 (citing Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170
(2005)).
79. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
80. Id. at 98.
81. Id. at 96.
82. Id.
83. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 296 (relying on Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991)).
84. Id. (relying on Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614 (1991)).
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purposeful discrimination, although such history can be used.85 The "invidi-
ous quality" of the action sought to be discriminatory must be traced back to
a discriminatory purpose. 86 In some cases, proof of a discriminatory impact
may be sufficient to show unconstitutionality because of the difficulty of
explaining it on nondiscriminatory grounds.87 The court must look at the to-
tality of the circumstances to see if the facts give inference to a discrimina-
tory purpose.8 8 Whichever standard for showing a prima facie case for
discrimination is used, it is the defendant's burden to prove purposeful
discrimination.89
A party issuing a Batson challenge need only present enough evidence
to show that there is an inference of discrimination.90 Raising the standard to
"strong likelihood," as stated by the California Supreme Court in Johnson v.
California, would place too high a burden on the defendant.91 The trial judge
should have the benefit of all information, including the prosecutor's expla-
nation for the strike, before deciding if a challenge was improperly moti-
vated.92 "We did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant
would have to persuade the judge-on the basis of all the facts, some of
which are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty."93 Although
the defendant carries the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove purposeful
discrimination, the first two steps of Batson are about producing evidence for
the trial court to determine the persuasiveness of the defendant's claim.94 "If
the proof requirement in step one is too high, Batson cannot bring 'actual
answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected
the jury selection."95 Furthermore, a lower standard of proof in step one
discourages judicial speculation on the reason for the strike, which is impre-
85. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
86. Id. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 94 (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 239-42).
89. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
90. Bobby Marzine Harges, Batson Challenges in Criminal Cases: After Snyder v.
Louisiana, Is Substantial Deference to the Trial Judge Still Required?, 19 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 193, 205 (Spring 2010) (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S.
162, 169 (2005)).
91. Harges, supra note 90, at 205 (quoting Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172).
92. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Harges, supra note 90, at 205 (quoting Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172).
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cise.96 Thus, a defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination need only
rise to the level that permits an inference of discrimination.97
Some jurisdictions have adopted bright-line rules for determining when
a discriminatory purpose has been shown. For example, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has held that simply requesting a Batson hearing establishes
prima facie evidence.98 Appealing a trial court's rejection of a Batson objec-
tion also gives rise to a prima facie showing of discrimination.99 If the party
challenging the strike makes a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent,
the analysis proceeds to step two.
ii. Batson's Step Two: Burden Shifting
Once the challenging party has established a discriminatory purpose, the
burden shifts to the striking party to provide a neutral explanation for the
strike.00 Simple denial of a discriminatory motive or an affirmation of a
good-faith challenge is not sufficient to establish a neutral explanation.101
The striking party must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of
his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenge.102 The proffered explana-
tion must not violate Equal Protection; therefore, it must be based on some-
thing other than race, gender, ethnicity,03 and in some circuits, sexual
orientation.104 However, the explanation need not be persuasive.05 "There-
fore, an 'implausible,' 'fantastic,' 'silly,' or 'superstitious' explanation-al-
though unlikely to ultimately carry the day in step three-is sufficient to
satisfy the burden imposed by Batson's second step so long as it is neu-
tral."106 Persuasiveness of the explanation does not come into play until the
third step where the court decides if the challenging party has sufficiently
proven purposeful discrimination.107
96. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 173 (noting how the disagreements among the state court
judges who reviewed the record for this case shows the impressive nature of
judicial speculation).
97. Id. at 166.
98. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 299 (citing State v. Jones, 358 S.E.2d 701, 703 (S.C.
1987)).
99. Id. (referencing Hernandez v. New York 500 U.S. 352 (1991)).
100. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
101. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014).
102. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).
103. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 300 (relying on Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769
(1995)).
104. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474.
105. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 300.
106. Id. (referencing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 775 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
107. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
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The courts are split on whether the consideration of discriminatory and
nondiscretionary factors in the decision to strike a juror violates the Equal
Protection Clause.0s Some jurisdictions use the "tainted approach," which
requires that any consideration of a discriminatory characteristic, even where
non-discriminatory motivations are present, is a violation.109 Other jurisdic-
tions use the "dual-motivation approach," which purports that offering both
neutral and discriminatory reasons for a strike does not per se violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, but leaves it to the court to decide if there is pres-
ence of purposeful discrimination that would result in an Equal Protection
violation. 110
In jurisdictions that apply the tainted approach theory, any expression of
a discriminatory reason for a juror strike will violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "The tainted approach's curtailment . . . merely recognizes that the
challenging party's 'ultimate burden' has been satisfied by the challenged
party's admission of impermissible considerations and that the third step de-
termination is, therefore, no longer necessary.""] Any admission of a dis-
criminatory purpose in a tainted approach jurisdiction is unconstitutional;
however, crafty lawyers can simply work around this by offering a neutral
explanation for the strike. For example, software calculations, which are pre-
sumably scientific and mathematical, may provide a neutral explanation.12
Therefore, the third step in the Batson framework is a determination by the
court as to the presence of a discriminatory purpose.
iii. Batson's Step Three: Discriminatory Purpose
Once a prima facie case of discriminatory intent has been shown, and
the party exercising the peremptory challenge has provided a neutral expla-
nation for the strike, the court then decides if the person opposing the strike
has proved purposeful discrimination.,3 If purposeful discrimination is
108. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 300.
109. Six states, Texas civil courts, the District of Columbia, and the United States
Court of Military Appeals adopt the "tainted" approach. Id. (Relying on
Sockwell v. State, 675 So. 2d 38, 40-41 (Ala. 1995); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d
160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994); McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1113; Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d
205, 210 (S.C. 1998); State v. Jagodinsky, 563 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997); Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991); Robinson v.
United States, 890 A.2d 674, 681 (D.C. 2006); United States v. Greene, 36 M.J.
274, 280 (C.M.A. 1993)).
110. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 303, 305.
111. Id. at 302.
112. Caplen, supra note 1, at 127-28.
113. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 297 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98
(1986)).
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proven, then the strike is voided.'14 Jurisdictions which apply the tainted ap-
proach will not reach this third step if a discriminatory reason for the strike is
stated.]15 However, cognizant attorneys will only give nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for the strike. Thus, the third step is present in jurisdictions that apply
the tainted approach, as well as in those that apply the dual-motivation ap-
proach. 116 Neutral explanations for jury strikes suggest that the nondiscrimi-
natory explanations offered by the striking party were pretexts." 7
In deciding whether a party has established purposeful discrimination
with the use of peremptory strikes, the court must consider all relevant evi-
dence. In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Supreme Court went into a detailed analy-
sis of the voir dire jury selection to show the presence of a discriminatory
purpose,"Is suggesting proof of discriminatory purpose is very fact specific.
The Court compared the voir dire questions presented to white and African-
American jurors and their responses, noting where questions differed, and
also remarking on the disparate treatment of white and African-American
jurors who gave similar responses.119 Specifically, African-American jurors
who were excluded from the jury panel actually had more favorable re-
sponses than those given by their white counterparts who were not similarly
challenged. 120
Furthermore, white and African-American jurors received disparate
treatment in the voir dire process as well. Fifty three percent of African-
American jurors-versus only six percent of white juror-were given
graphic descriptions of the defendant's possible death sentence.'21 When
questioned, the prosecutor stated that only those who expressed ambivalence
toward the death penalty got the graphic description.122
However, the Court rejected this racial neutral explanation, because
only thirty percent of white jurors who expressed their doubts received the
graphic script, compared to eighty-six percent of the African-American ju-
rors.12 3 The racially-neutral explanations provided by the prosecution
"reek[ed] of afterthought" and therefore demonstrated purposeful discrimina-
114. Id. at 305.
115. Id.
116. Id. (stating that the third step will always be reached in dual-motivation
jurisdictions).
117. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 246 (2005).
118. See generally Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231.
119. Id. at 249-62.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 255-56.
122. Id. at 257.
123. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 260.
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tion.124 This case emphasized the trial court's responsibility to do a fact-in-
tensive inquiry "to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all
evidence with a bearing on it."125 Where purposeful discrimination is shown,
the challenged strike must be voided.126
iv. The Difficulties of Applying Batson, Post-Miller-El
While Miller-El stands for the proposition that the trial court should
conduct a detailed analysis of voir dire to determine if a party's proffered
explanation for a strike is pretextual, another Supreme Court case shows how
subjective that final decision can be. In Snyder v. Louisiana, the defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder in the trial court and sentenced to
death.127 On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his Batson
claim, confirmed his sentence, and remanded to determine if the defendant
was competent to stand trial.128 On remand, the trial court found him compe-
tent to stand trial and affirmed.129 Snyder then petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, but while his petition was pending, the Court ruled on
Miller-El, and remanded his case to the Louisiana Supreme Court for further
consideration in light of Miller-El.13o Louisiana's highest court once again
rejected the defendant's Batson claims. 31 However, Snyder's persistence
paid off. He petitioned again for certiorari, which the Court granted; it then
reversed the holding of the Louisiana high court. 32
Under Miller-El, the trial court must consider "all the circumstances that
bear upon the issue of racial animosity." 33 The prosecution in that case used
its peremptory strikes to remove all five African-American jurors remaining
after the court issued all its challenges for cause; however, Snyder's Batson
claim focused on only two of those challenges. 34 When the Court deter-
mined the presence of purposeful discrimination against one juror, Mr.
Brooks, an analysis of the other strike became unnecessary. 35
When asked the reason for the strike, the prosecution stated that Brooks
seemed nervous throughout the questioning and expressed concerns about
124. Id. at 246.
125. Caplen, supra note 1, at 105.
126. Gadwood, supra note 4, at 305.
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taking time off from his work as a student teacher. The prosecutors used
these concerns to argue that Brooks might concede to an unfair verdict, sim-
ply to get done faster and return to work.136 Because "nervousness cannot be
shown from a cold transcript," the trial judge is given great deference.137
However, there were several problems with the trial court's treatment of
Brooks. First, the record did not show the judge's specific findings regarding
the juror's demeanor. Additionally, the trial judge did not address the juror
challenge until days after Brooks had been questioned.At that point, it was
questionable whether the judge was able to specifically recall Brooks'
demeanor. 138
The Court also rejected the prosecutor's second reason for striking
Brooks, stating there were fifty other members of the venire who expressed a
concern that jury service would interfere with work, school, or family.139 In
fact, the trial court actually had a clerk speak to Brooks' boss to confirm that
jury service would not interfere with his graduation from school.140 Brooks
did not express any concern about the jury service after the phone call.141
Thus, the prosecution's "apprehension that Mr. Brooks, in order to minimize
the student-teaching hours missed during jury service, might have been moti-
vated to find petitioner guilty, not of first-degree murder, but of a lesser in-
cluded offense because this would obviate the need for a penalty phase
proceeding" was highly speculative.142
The brevity of the defendant's trial makes the prosecutor's second ex-
planation even more suspicious.143 The implausibility of the prosecutor's ex-
cuse is further emphasized by the fact that white jurors who expressed
similar concerns were not struck.]44 The Court specifically compared Brooks
to another juror with far more pressing job and family concerns who was not
struck. 145
The Court, interestingly enough, made no mention of the prosecutor's
rebuttal argument in the punishment phase, which included a deliberate at-
tempt to bring sensitive racial issues into the case. 146 The prosecutor repeat-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 479 (internal citations omitted).
138. Id.
139. Snyder, 522 U.S. at 480.
140. Id. at 480-82.
141. Id. at 482.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 482-83.
144. Id. at 483.
145. Snyder, 522 U.S. at 483.
146. Harges, supra note 90, at 215 (referencing what occurred during sentencing in
State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832 (La. 1999) ("Snyder II")).
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edly referenced O.J. Simpson's high-profile murder trial, decided just one
year before.147 "During his rebuttal argument of the penalty phase of the Sny-
der [II] trial, the prosecutor urged the all-white jury not to let this O.J. proto-
type 'get away with' murder."148 The Court's silence on this fact could have,
in part, resulted from a desire to avoid the media frenzy surrounding the
Simpson case.149 Perhaps the Court wanted to make a statement that discrimi-
nation does not have to be so blatant to violate the principles of Batson.50
Either way, Snyder represents a perfect example of the difficulty in en-
forcing the Batson framework. The Louisiana Supreme Court was explicitly
directed by the Supreme Court of the United States to review Snyder's case
in light of Miller-El and consider all the relevant circumstances.15, Despite
the disparate voir dire treatment of jurors and the prosecutor's obvious at-
tempts to invoke discriminatory feelings in them, the highest court of Louisi-
ana found no discrimination in the peremptory strikes of every African-
American juror who survived challenge for cause, even when specifically
directed by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the specific circumstances of
the case.
The Court's decision in Snyder sends a message that discrimination
does not have to be blatant in order to violate the Batson principles as applied
to Equal Protection. The elimination of a sole juror on the basis of race is
sufficient to warrant violation. Furthermore, the detailed analysis of the
lower court's voir dire sends a message to trial judges that they should ac-
tively ensure that race does not play a role in jury selection. However, this is
the same message the Court gave in Miller-El, and it was not upheld by the
Louisiana Court in spite of explicit instructions to review Snyder in light of
that case. Noble principles are only effective when they are enforceable at
every level; the Supreme Court cannot grant certiorari on every case where
Batson has not been followed. As Justice Kennedy eloquently stated, "de-
spite the clarity of these commands to eliminate the taint of racial discrimina-
tion in the administration of justice, allegations of bias in the jury selection
process persist."52
C. Extending Batson
i. Applying Batson to Different Races: Powers v. Ohio (1991)
In Powers v. Ohio, the Court held that the exclusion of jurors on the
basis of race, even where the excluded juror and the criminal defendant were
147. Id.
148. Harges, supra note 90, at 215.
149. Id. at 216.
150. Id.
151. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 522 U.S. 472, 476 (2008).
152. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
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not of the same race, violates Equal Protection.153 The Court reasoned that
Equal Protection was meant to protect the rights of the defendant, jurors, and
community at large.54 The state argued that a criminal defendant does not
have the right to challenge the strike of a juror, because the struck juror is the
person whose Equal Protection rights have been violated.155 However, the
Powers Court granted third-party standing to the defendant, noting that third-
party standing is appropriate where the defendant suffered an actual injury,
shares a close relationship with the third party, and faces some hindrance in
bringing his own claim.156
The Court established several guidelines for future courts to consider in
granting third-party standing in this context. First, a criminal defendant is
entitled to third-party standing for a juror eliminated under the Batson princi-
ples. The logic is that a criminal defendant suffers injury when discrimina-
tory strikes lead to a tainted trial that leaves the "fairness of the criminal
proceeding in doubt."57 Second, criminal defendants and venire members
have an interest in eliminating discrimination in the courtroom. 58 A venire
person excluded because of his race suffers a personal humiliation, and "may
lose confidence in the courts and its verdicts, as may the defendant if his or
her objections cannot be heard."' 59 Lastly, although venire members have a
legal right to bring suits on their own behalf, these claims are rare. 60 Ex-
cluded jurors have no opportunity to be heard at the time of the strike, as they
are not parties to the suit, often have little financial incentive to pursue litiga-
tion, and would have a difficult time showing the likelihood of future voir
dire discrimination necessary to get injunctive relief. I61Thus, defendants meet
the qualifications necessary to establish third-party standing on behalf of an
excluded juror. 162
ii. Applying Batson to Civil Litigation: Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co. (1991)
The Supreme Court in Edmonson v. LeesviUle Concrete Co. noted that
racial discrimination harms an excluded juror as much in a civil trial as it
153. Id. at 402.
154. Id. at 406.
155. Id. at 410.
156. Id. at 411.
157. Id.
158. Harges, supra note 90, at 199 (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14).
159. Powers, 499 U.S. at 414.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 414-15.
162. Id. at 415.
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does in a criminal trial.163 Still, the Court found racial discrimination uncon-
stitutional only when done by state actors, which brings Batson's applicabil-
ity to civil proceedings in question.164 There are instances when the Court has
found that governmental authority so dominates private conduct that the pri-
vate actors are deemed to have acted with the government's authority, and
are thus subject to constitutional constraints.165 In determining when this ap-
plies, the Court considers the extent to which the actor relies on governmen-
tal assistance and benefits.166 The sole purpose of peremptory challenges is to
permit litigants to help the government select an impartial trier of fact.167
Thus, the use of peremptory challenges by civil parties is pursuant to state
action and therefore subject to nondiscriminatory exercise.168
iii. Applying Batson to Criminal Defendants: Georgia v.
McCollum (1992)
In Georgia v. McCollum, the Court reasoned that the jurors in voir dire
also function as state actors and applied Batson to peremptory strikes lodged
by criminal defendants.169 In McCollum, the defendants were white men ac-
cused of killing two African-American victims.170 Prior to the start of jury
selection, the prosecutor sought an order requesting a Batson challenge if the
defendants used peremptory strikes to dismiss African-American jurors.171
Lower courts had previously denied the motion, which left the decision en-
tirely to the United States Supreme Court.172
The Court considered four questions in determining whether criminal
defendants may exercise discriminatory strikes.173 First, is there harm where
a defendant discriminates in voir dire?174 Second, do defendants count as
state actors when exercising peremptory strikes?175 Third, do prosecutors
163. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 620.
166. Id. at 621.
167. Id. at 620.
168. Id. at 622.
169. Prior to Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992), the Court had only
applied Batson to prosecutors. Harges, supra note 90, at 200 (citing McCollum,
505 U.S. at 56).
170. Id. (citing McCollum, 505 U.S. at 44-45).
171. Id. (citing McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48-50).
172. Id.
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have standing to raise the constitutional challenge?76 Finally, do the defen-
dant's constitutional rights preclude the extension of Batson to criminal
defendants?77
Using the Powers rationale, the Court found that jurors are subject to the
same harm regardless of who is exercising the strike.178 Prosecutors also have
an equal goal in ensuring fair criminal trials that do not undermine the com-
munity's confidence in the court system, which is essential in "preserving
community peace."'179 Therefore, prosecutors have valid third-party standing
to bring a claim on the juror's behalf.
Furthermore, the court applied the reasoning in Edmond to determine
that when a defendant exercises peremptory challenges, he becomes a state
actor.180 Lastly, the court held that the use of peremptory strikes is not a right
guaranteed by the constitution and therefore, it does not violate a defendant's
constitutional rights to place limitations on the use of peremptory chal-
lenges.181 Accordingly, both defendants and prosecutors in criminal trials are
precluded from eliminating jurors on the basis of race.
iv. Applying Batson to Gender: J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.
(1994)
In 1994, the court held that peremptory strikes cannot be used to dis-
criminate based on gender.182 In a paternity suit, the state used nine peremp-
tory strikes to eliminate all men from the jury. 183 "Intentional discrimination
on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause,
particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate
invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of
men and women."184 "Gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror
competence and impartiality."185 Consequently, just as jurors are afforded




178. Id. at 49.
179. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49.
180. Id. at 52.
181. Id. at 57.
182. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
183. Harges, supra note 90, at 202 (referring to J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140).
184. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31.
185. Id. at 128.
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V. THE DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTING BATSON
A. Discretion Given to the Trial Judge
Miller-El illustrates the practical problems with Batson's goal of ending
racial discrimination while still preserving the use of peremptory chal-
lenges.186 Miller-El's claim was strong, as he could show disparate questions
and treatment of white and African-American jurors whose proffered reasons
for the strikes reeked of afterthought. Yet, both the trial court and appellate
court found no constitutional violations. There is great discretion given to the
court to decide the presence of discriminatory purpose, and a challenge is
reviewed for clear error at the appellate level.187
During the nineteen years between Batson and Miller-El, forty-two Bat-
son challenges were brought in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
eighty-one percent of those rulings were affirmed.188 In Miller-El's seventeen
years of litigation and twenty-three judges, only six judges found that the
Batson standard had been violated.189 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Breyer addressed how technology-specifically jury selection software-is
exasperating the problem.190 He stated:
The use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selec-
tion process seems better organized and more systematized than
ever before .... Whether you are trying a civil case or a criminal
case, [jury-selection software] has likely determined the exact
demographics (age, race, gender, education, occupation, marital
status, number of children, religion, and income) of the type of
jurors you should select and the type you should strike.'9'
The anti-discriminatory command and use of peremptory challenges that en-
courage the use of stereotypes work at cross-purposes.192
186. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating
that despite the strength of Miller-El's claim, his case consisted of seventeen
years of mostly unsuccessful litigation spanning eight different judicial pro-
ceedings and involving twenty-three judges, only six of whom found a Batson
violation).
187. A trial court's findings of a challenge are given great deference, because the
trial judge's decision will largely turn on an evaluation of credibility. Mimi
Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 103
(2008).
188. Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1709 (2006).
189. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 267 (Breyer, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 270.
191. Id. at 270-71.
192. Id. at 271-72.
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B. The Difficulty with Articulating a Neutral Response
In addition, attorneys who rely on subjective factors or instinct to strike
jurors may have a difficult time explaining the rationale for the strike in
neutral, plausible terms. 193 Some attorneys relying on instinct may use in-
tangibles like eye contact, tone of voice, posture, laughing, or coughing,94
while other attorneys may subconsciously rely on stereotypes. 95 In order for
trial courts to effectively decide if the proffered nondiscriminatory explana-
tion is believable, the court would have to recall the proceedings "with a
degree of detail that is wholly unrealistic." 196 For example:
Thus after a prosecutor sets forth a neutral reason for the strike,
unless the court can recall whether Juror X was or was not making
eye contact with the prosecutor earlier in the day or whether Juror
Y was dozing, fidgeting, or laughing on day two of a four day voir
dire process, then the trial judge has no evidence upon which to
evaluate the prosecutor's credibility.'97
Furthermore, attorneys who strike a juror on the basis of how she looked or
acted, rather than on the basis of what she said in voir dire, or how she
responded to a jury questionnaire, may not have reliable evidence, because
that sort of information does not appear in written transcripts.198 Appellate
courts would have an even harder time than trial courts in determining the
plausibility of neutral explanations without the benefit of any situational
context. 199
C. Evidence That Can Be Used in Batson Challenges
Both Miller-El and Snyder indicate that a trial judge should carefully
scrutinize all of the relevant information to determine if an explanation for a
strike is legitimate, or a pretext for discrimination.200 Judges can use side-by-
side comparisons of struck venire persons with those who were empanel-
led.20 Where the neutral explanation does not withstand the scrutiny, the
judge should find a Batson violation.02 Where a prosecutor gives a nondis-
criminatory explanation that references the juror's demeanor, the court
193. Samuel, supra note 187, at 106.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 97.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 98.
198. Id.
199. Samuel, supra note 187, at 97, 98.
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should evaluate both the juror's demeanor to determine the credibility of the
strike, as well as the prosecutor's demeanor to determine if he is concealing a
discriminatory intent.203
Snyder emphasized that a Batson violation can occur with the striking of
a single juror if done in a discriminatory manner.2 04 Thus, the side-by-side
comparison is important to find individual violations.205 Disparate treatment
between jurors of different races can show intent.206 Disparate treatment can
be observed through the questions posed to each venire member, as demon-
strated by presentation of a more graphic description of the death penalty in
the Miller-El case.2 07 Disparate treatment can also be observed in the attor-
ney's tone of voice, language used, or general demeanor towards members of
different racial groups.208 As a result, it becomes important for the attorney
challenging the strike to make a detailed record of the situation giving rise to
the challenge.09
In both Miller-El and Snyder, the Court conducted side-by-side compar-
isons of voir dire to determine that the neutral explanations offered by the
prosecution were merely a pretext for discriminatory intent. "If the race-neu-
tral reason given for striking a member of a particular race applies with equal
force to a member of a different race, and the prosecutor did not exercise a
peremptory challenge against that person, there may be sufficient evidence to
prove purposeful discrimination under Batson's third step."210 Patterns of dis-
crimination can also be used to show a neutral explanation was merely a
pretext to discriminatory intent.211
VI. CRITIQUE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: AN ARGUMENT
FOR ELIMINATION
Critics of Batson suggest either abandoning the Batson protections,
eliminating peremptory challenges entirely, or limiting the scope of Batson in
criminal trials.212 For example, one critic stated:
Batson and its progeny, have made a further muck of things by
transforming voir dire into a lengthy ordeal involving inquires into
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nothing to do with impartiality, but will also become increasingly
muddled in the face of our changing society.213
Additionally, Judge Maureen A. Howard suggests in the Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics that prosecutors should voluntarily waive peremptory
challenges because they are uniquely bound to "seek justice."214 She claims
the marginal benefit from peremptory challenges in criminal prosecution is
outweighed by the damage done to "actual and perceived fairness of the sys-
tem."215 Furthermore, she posits that while Batson was extended to the de-
fendants in Powers, the court had to first rationalize that any party is a state
actor when that party is helping the court select jurors. However, this ration-
alization is unnecessary because prosecutors are by definition, state employ-
ees, and no further explanation is required.
The elimination of peremptory challenges would solve the problem in
applying Batson fairly and consistently; yet, many attorneys like the control
that peremptory challenges provide. Proponents of the peremptory challenge,
including most trial lawyers, view peremptory challenges as a critical tool in
securing a favorable jury that allows them to strike jurors they find unsympa-
thetic to their case, without having to explain why they think so. 216 Peremp-
tory challenges "allow[ ] lawyers and their clients to feel that they have some
control in selecting the jury and to feel comfortable with the jury that will
hear their case."217
In addition, the American Bar Association continues to support the use
of peremptory challenges, the standards of which presume peremptory chal-
lenges to be nondiscriminatory in nature. 218 However, "to 'presume' that per-
emptory challenges are exercised in a permissible manner is to turn a blind
eye to the history of this practice as it has been highlighted" in Supreme
Court cases from the historic Swain and Batson to recent cases like Johnson
and Miller-El.219
Tradition has power in common law, and peremptory challenges have
been around since the beginning. Judges have respect for peremptory chal-
lenges because they have always been part of the American legal system and
were often used in the nation's infancy to eliminate jurors sympathetic to the
213. Id. at 129 n.63 (quoting Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001) (Meyers, J., concurring)).
214. Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Volunta-
rily Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 369, 370 (2010).
215. Id.
216. Marder, supra note 188, at 1685.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1686 (referencing the A.B.A. Principles for Juries and Jury Trials).
219. Id. at 1687.
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Crown.220 Thus, it seems unlikely that peremptory challenges will disappear
from our legal system any time soon.
A. The Standard of Review on Batson Challenges
While strikes for challenge eliminate jurors with obvious bias, peremp-
tory strikes allow attorneys to strike jurors with a subtle bias that may not
rise to the level needed for a strike for cause.2 21 However, "the interplay
between peremptory challenges and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution has created a riddle: the courts must attempt to maintain a challenge
that lawyers can exercise arbitrarily while simultaneously requesting a reason
for the challenge."222 Because the trial judge has the ability to evaluate the
demeanor of both venire persons and attorneys, appellate courts will give
substantial deference to the trial judge's decision in a Batson challenge.223 An
appellate court will not overrule a trial court's decision on a Batson challenge
unless it is clearly erroneous. 224
For an appellate court to consider the appropriateness of a trial court's
ruling on a Batson challenge, the appellate court must have a sufficient re-
cord.225 Therefore, once a Batson challenge has been requested by the de-
fense, the prosecutor should request a finding on-record regarding all the
neutral reasons offered by the prosecution to provide a more detailed record
for the appellate court.226
It has been argued that Snyder may have expanded the authority of the
reviewing court.227 Despite the Snyder Court stating that it should defer to the
trial judge except in exceptional circumstances, it also reiterated the fact that
the trial and reviewing courts should consider all circumstances that bear
relevance on the issue of racial animosity.228 By dictating that the reviewing
court look at all relevant circumstances, the Snyder Court gave the appellate
court power that the trial court did not have.229 The appellate court has the
benefit of viewing the entire record without the myriad responsibilities a trial
judge faces during jury selection, such as handling objections, and making
220. Id. at 1690.
221. Harges, supra note 90, at193.
222. Id. at 194.
223. Id. at 218.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 221.
226. Id.
227. Harges, supra note 90, at 221.
228. Id. (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)).
229. Id.
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general first-hand observations that allow her to "easily miss many forms of
discrimination, subtle or not, that may occur during voir dire."230
For example, an appellate judge may be better able to compare disparate
questions posed to venire members of different races as the appellate court
has as much time as needed to review the record, whereas judges in voir dire
are pressed for time.231 An appellate judge would also have the benefit of
viewing the trial in its entirety, including the opening and closing statements
to the jurors. Statements, such as those of the prosecutor in Snyder who made
references to the racially-charged O.J. Simpson case, may provide further
insight into an attorney's true reason for striking a juror. Nonetheless, the
appellate judge still does not have the benefit of these firsthand observa-
tions.232 Some have argued that video-recording voir dire may provide the
appellate judges with firsthand observations and the benefit of viewing the
situation in toto.
B. Can Video-recording of Voir Dire Be the Solution?
The videotaping of voir dire may offer some additional support in as-
sessing the validity of a juror strike under Batson, as it would provide evi-
dence of some of the intangible things used as the basis for the strike.233
Without the use of video-recorded voir dire, a judge is charged with deter-
mining the plausibility of an attorney's neutral reason based on evidence; yet,
there is no evidence other than the judge's own memory and the memory of
counsel "who are now required to act in the dual role of witness and advo-
cate."234 Combining these roles is inherently dangerous.235
Several realities of jury trials favor videotaping voir dire. For instance,
when providing reasons for their strikes, prosecutors often respond with non-
verbal reasons which cannot be recorded by a court stenographer.236 In addi-
tion, trial judges review challenges and their explanations after the fact,
which does not provide the judge an opportunity to focus on the behavior or
responses of any particular juror.237 Finally, a trial judge's review of a chal-
lenge may not even occur until hours or days after the voir dire
proceedings.38
230. Id.
231. Id. at 222.
232. Id. at 221.
233. Some litigants have argued for the videotaping of voir dire to make a visual
record of some of the intangible things they use to strike jurors. Samuel, supra
note 187, at 104.
234. Id. at 122.
235. Id. at 124.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 125.
238. Id.
2014]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
Videotapes of voir dire would provide more evidence for the both the
trial and appellate judges to view.239 Video-recording voir dire may make the
trial judge's decision on a Batson challenge stronger, because it provides a
record of all the circumstances, including situational context. Video-recorded
voir dire may also make de novo appellate review of trial court findings in
Batson challenges a real possibility.40 "Videotaped voir dire records could
give new life to Batson. In particular, that technology would permit the ap-
pellate court to meaningfully test a prosecutor's claim that she struck a par-
ticular juror based on his demeanor."241
However, appellate courts are reluctant to use video technology, be-
cause viewing the trial proceedings as they happen "imperils the legitimacy
of the whole enterprise of appellate review."242 The use of video recordings
may blur the lines between the factfinder and the reviewing court.2 43
Deference to the trial court is more than a matter of recognition that the
judge who witnesses a situation firsthand is the best finder of fact; it is also a
"deliberate political and institutional choice: a preference for finality and
economy, even at the possible expense of accuracy."244 Even where the barri-
ers for substantive oversight are removed through the use of technology, re-
viewing courts still emphasize the deference to the trial court.245 Some argue
that in a vertical system of review, decision-making should be limited at each
level as to provide some meaningful level of review of each court in its own
right.246
A video-recorded voir dire would give the appellate court more ability
to engage in a comparative analysis of voir dire, like that conducted in
Miller-El.247 It would also provide a meaningful test for the appellate court to
determine the plausibility of a prosecutor's claim that a juror was struck for
her demeanor where such claims would otherwise be insulated from review,
even on the grounds of clear error, on appeal.248
Technologies may make de novo fact-findings of Batson challenges
possible, but courts have not been eager to implement them. Video review
239. Samuel, supra note 187, at 123.
240. Robert C. Owen & Melissa Mather, Thawing Out the "Cold Record": Some
Thoughts on How Videotaped Records May Affect Traditional Standards of
Deference on Direct and Collateral Review, 2 J. App. PRAC. & PROCEss 411,
412 (Summer 2000).
241. Id. at 425.
242. Id. at 413.
243. Samuel, supra note 187, at 110.
244. Owen & Mather, supra note 240, at 413.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 415.
247. Id. at 425.
248. Id. at 415.
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does not minimize cost and may lead to a re-presentation of the same argu-
ment, essentially taking away the significance of each level of court.249
The video-recording of voir dire also has privacy concerns for the ju-
rors, as it is more intrusive then a written record. Trial attorneys already have
to overcome a juror's natural fear of speaking about their "deep-seated feel-
ings, and indeed biases, which develop over a lifetime."250 Jurors may feel
even less comfortable expressing bias if they are aware of the fact that they
are being video-recorded.
Despite these potential pitfalls, the video-recording of voir dire may
provide evidence for an appellate judge to consider the validity of explana-
tions for strikes challenged under Batson. However, judges are reluctant to
allow it.251 Video-recorded court proceedings may alter the standard of re-
view at the appellate level, which could undermine judicial economy and the
lower courts' power. Nonetheless, a visual record of circumstances surround-
ing the strike of a juror could drastically impact the judicial findings of fact
in Batson's step three. It would provide proof of a juror's demeanor that
would prove or undermine the prosecutor's offered explanation for a strike.
This visual record could be helpful at both the trial and appellate levels.
VII. APPLYING BATSON TO JURY SELECTION SOFTWARE
The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the legality of jury-selection
software and Equal Protection. Despite Justice Breyer's 2005 suggestion in
Miller-El that jury-selection software that factors race or gender into the
equation is unconstitutional, the Court has not discussed it.252 However, the
Court did address whether a similar program for university admissions vio-
lates Equal Protection in Grutter v. Bollinger.253 Although the Court ulti-
mately held race could be factored into admissions policies because the First
Amendment allowed universities to consider what compelling interests they
249. Id. at 425.
250. Greg Cesarano, Voir Dire for Today's World: For a Successful Voir Dire,
Think Like a Juror, 22 No. 3 PRAC. LITIGATOR 35, 35 (2011).
251. In Baker v. A.W. Chesterrton Co., 2010 WL 1734635 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (Trial
Order) (2010), the court allowed a network to videorecord proceedings but held
it could not record any part of the jury selection, and none of the recordings
would be a matter of record.
252. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 271 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating
that the use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury selection process
seems better organized and systematic than before due to the ratings used injury demographics and jury selection software).
253. Caplen, supra note 1, at 130 (noting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315
(2003)).
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had,254 the calculation of race as a "plus-factor" as "one element of many"
has possible implications for jury-selection programs. 255
In mixed-motive jurisdictions, the may not violate Equal Protection on
its face, because race or gender is only one factor among many. "Grutter
encourages and promotes a validly constitutional software scheme in which
'race .. . still matters,"' but is only part of the calculation.256 Furthermore,
the complexity of jury-selection software programs may make it easy for
attorneys to fabricate plausible race-neutral explanations for a strike, satisfy-
ing step two of the Batson framework.57 Attorneys could simply run multi-
ple permutations using different factors until the computation and factors are
undiscernible.258 How could a trial or appellate judge, who is not likely
versed in methods of computer computations, determine with accuracy what
the reason for a strike is, when the attorney may not even be able to articulate
a response based on anything other than a computer program?
The software is designed to consider multiple objective factors and indi-
vidualized, subjective factors, which substantially hinders any discriminatory
motivation.259 Any race-based strike traced back to a software recommenda-
tion is likely insulated from attack by "an abundance of quantitative and
qualitative" neutral variables which the program considers in its calcula-
tion.260 These programs could not only make it harder for defendants to es-
tablish prima facie cases of discrimination, they may also provide a neutral
explanation to striking attorneys. 261
Software programs may also affect step three of the Batson framework
by making it harder for judges to determine the presence of a discriminatory
purpose. The complexity of the programs makes them difficult to explain and
understand, which may discourage judicial scrutiny.262 "Moreover, the ab-
sence of uniform policies regarding software usage, educating the court in its
mechanics will likely be cumbersome, delaying voir dire with disruptive
technological inquiry, and overall impacting the expeditious administration
of a court's caseload."263
254. Id. at 108.
255. Id. at 121 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315).
256. Id. at 125.
257. John Gibeaut, Justices Criticize Jury Selection Bias Again: Supreme Court
Sends Back Texas Capital Case for Retrial, ABA JOURNAL EREPORT (June 21,
2005), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/-nesson/ABAJournal-Article.pdf.
258. Caplen, supra note 1, at 125.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 127.
261. Id. at 125-27.
262. Id. at 129.
263. Id.
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The Model Rules of Professional Behavior do not expressly prohibit
software usage by lawyers or jury consultants.264 However, programs that
consider race or gender as factors for elimination of a juror likely violate
Equal Protection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the American legal system has always allowed peremptory
strikes, which traditionally required no explanation, the courts are now exer-
cising more judicial control over them. Starting in 1986 with Batson, the
Supreme Court held that striking jurors based on race violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Later cases extended these pro-
tections to gender, sexual orientation, and ethnicity and applied those
protections in both civil and criminal cases.
There is a three-part framework for determining whether an Equal Pro-
tection violation has occurred. First, the challenger must show a prima facie
case of discrimination. This requires only an inference that a discriminatory
purpose is present. Second, the attorney issuing the strike must provide a
neutral explanation for doing so; but that explanation need not be persuasive.
Finally, the trial court determines if the explanation is legitimate or merely a
pretext for discrimination.
Some jurisdictions use the tainted approach and invalidate a strike if any
consideration of a discriminatory factor occurs. Other jurisdictions hold that
a strike partially based on discriminatory reasons will be valid if the attorney
can iterate a plausible neutral explanation. The Supreme Court has not made
any decisions on which approach is correct, but stresses that the totality of
the circumstances in each challenge should be evaluated.
Several cases, especially Snyder, illustrate the difficulties courts face
when enforcing the Batson framework. The Supreme Court remanded Snyder
to the Louisiana Supreme Court with specific directions to review it in light
of the Miller-El fact-intensive inquiry. Yet, the Louisiana Supreme Court
found no Batson violation, despite the prosecutor's racially-incited closing
argument during sentencing that referenced the recent OJ Simpson case.
Video-recording of voir dire may provide trial and appellate judges with
more tools to judge the truth of allegedly neutral explanations for strikes. The
technology would allow appellate courts to conduct de novo reviews of trial
judge's findings on Batson challenges by giving context to visual clues, like
demeanor, which may cause an attorney to strike a juror. However, video
recording voir dire is met with resistance, because it threatens to change the
amount of deference given to trial judges. Despite its potential benefits to the
fairness of jury selection, visual recordings of voir dire ultimately threaten
the power of the trial court and diminish judicial efficacy.
Jury selection software, although not strictly unconstitutional, may in
fact violate the Equal Protection Clause, because it considers constitution-
264. Caplen, supra note 1, at 130.
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ally-protected demographic information, such as race and gender, to help at-
torneys strike jurors who may be unsympathetic to their cause. Furthermore,
the algorithms used in such software may be a pretext for discriminatory
strikes. They present challenges in all steps of the Batson framework by mak-
ing it more difficult for (1) a challenging party to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination; (2) a striking party to provide a neutral explanation for the
strike;, and (3) a judge to determine the validity of the reason offered for the
strike.
These technologies may simply highlight the bigger problem: more than
twenty-three years after Batson, the Supreme Court has yet to establish a
standard for what constitutes discriminatory intent. The Court has not re-
solved the dispute between those jurisdictions which apply the tainted ap-
proach and those which apply the mixed-motive principles. There is no
answer as to whether any consideration of race or gender will violate Batson,
even with a neutral explanation. Perhaps the reason the Court has refused to
address the issue is because it is impossible to retain peremptory challenges
and still ensure that no juror is struck for discriminatory purposes.
Justice Marshall, in Batson, suggested that the elimination of peremp-
tory challenges altogether may be the only way to ensure that jurors are not
eliminated for discriminatory purposes. Supporters of this proposition argue
that it is impossible to ensure the constitutionality of peremptory strikes,
which require no justification, with a mandate that such strikes not be based
on race or gender. They, however, represent the minority opinion. Overturn-
ing peremptory challenges is unlikely to happen any time soon. Many trial
attorneys feel more comfortable when they can eliminate certain peoples
from the venire. Furthermore, peremptory strikes have been part of the
American legal system since its inception. The courts and legislature are
likely to resist uprooting such a longstanding tradition.
Nonetheless, it does seem likely that the groups shielded by the Batson
umbrella may expand. The Ninth Circuit recently extended the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in Batson challenges to apply to sexual orientation. The Supreme
Court in United States v. Windsor recently held that sexual orientation de-
serves strict scrutiny and, thus, Equal Protection.65 It seems likely that the
Supreme Court decision will extend similar protections nationwide.
Attorneys at both tables in the civil and criminal contexts need to be
aware of Batson's limitations on peremptory challenges. Those who strike
jurors based on gender, race, and ethnicity in any court in the United States
stand to have their verdicts overturned for constitutional violations. They also
risk the ire, and subsequent lawsuits, of those jurors whose constitutional
rights were abused. Although unlikely, such lawsuits are permissible. Attor-
265. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that
the federal definition of marriage as a union exclusively between a man and
woman violates the Fifth Amendment and all legally married homosexual
couples are entitled to all the same federal benefits as heterosexual married
couples).
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neys must also be aware of other categories of people that may be protected
by Batson in their specific districts.
Jury-selection software that uses race, gender, or ethnicity in its calcula-
tions should be used with extreme caution, and attorneys should always be
prepared to iterate an explanation for striking a juror that is not based on
these technologies. Peremptory strikes, although controversial, will likely
continue in our legal system for some time. Attorneys should exercise care
and caution when using them.

